Después de todo, Irlanda no se equivocó… los demás no la tienen tan fácil

Buen trabajo sobre las razones por las que Irlanda no estuvo tan errada en su aproximación a la crisis del 2008.  De haber abandonado el Euro, el costo habría sido mayor al que vimos, aunque probablemente distribuido sobre una base mayor de la población (la solución irlandesa hizo sufrir más a los que más se beneficiaron durante el boom: real estate e industrias relacionadas como construcción):

[…] the problem in the boom was not one of all prices inflating to the same degree. As credit was injected into the economy asymmetric affects resulted, leading to erroneous price signals sent to investors. As an example, cheap credit engendered a housing boom, leading property prices to rise faster than other prices. As a consequence, many Irish resources were directed to the real estate market, at the expense of other productive activities[…]  The false price signals sent to entrepreneurs needed to be corrected: housing prices needed to fall relative to other prices. A depreciation in the nominal exchange rate would have resulted in an equivalent decline in all prices. As a consequence it is not guaranteed that the relative price maladjustments will be rectified by such a policy. What is necessary at some point in time is an alteration of the domestic constellation of prices.

Por su parte, la estrategia de Islandia de devaluar, tuvo algunas desventajas que dificultan aún hoy la recuperación:

[…] while a currency depreciation will aid exporters to some degree, it has two significant drawbacks. The first of these is that an expansion of the money supply is necessary to depreciate a currency, and such a policy places upward pressure on prices (as was the case in Iceland). The result is potentially nil, as the two effects may counter each other. The second drawback is a consequence of the first—any depreciation of the currency aids one group while harming another. In this case, exporters may be aided, while domestic consumers and producers will see their costs increase, and their real savings dwindle, so that a decline in savings through an inflationary policy will hinder recovery

El trabajo también explica por qué Grecia, España, Portugal e Italia no la tienen tan fácil como Irlanda.  Si no lo quieren leer completo vayan directo a las páginas entre la 30 y la 34.